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for a Complex Problem
Tanya M. Woods*
ABSTRACT
As the web evolves, so too are discussions on how to manage the
rights of copyright owners online. Finding a solution that is balanced
and that accounts for the international nature of the Internet is
essential. While many have attempted to craft such a solution, a model
that accommodates the spontaneity of copyright content users and that
recognizes the multi-territorial nature of the Internet has yet to
materialize. For this reason, this Article formulates a macro-level
conceptual approach to building a practical copyright licensing model
that could generate spontaneous digital copyright licenses to
accommodate the creative impulses of web users and remain
compatible with emerging technological advances like Web 3.0. To
achieve this end, this Article encourages copyright and technology
stakeholders to regroup and re-focus their attention in a collaborative
and cooperative way to ensure that content users see copyright
clearance as a simple process rather than a burden or obstacle.
Barrister and Solicitor in the Province of Ontario, Canada. LL.M. Candidate,
American University Washington College of Law, 2009; LL.M., University of Ottawa, 2009;
LL.B., University of Ottawa, 2007; B.A., University of Ottawa, 2001. The author is grateful
for the feedback provided by Professors Daniel Gervais, Jerome Reichman, Peter Jaszi,
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As the web has evolved, so too have discussions on how to
manage the rights of copyright owners online. However, the
development of a balanced international solution has been
significantly slow due to the complex legal and policy issues that run
far deeper than most content users realize.1  While many have
attempted to navigate through these issues in order to establish a
copyright licensing model that accommodates the spontaneity of
copyright content users, a practical and internationally viable solution
has yet to materialize.
This Article advocates a macro-level conceptual approach to
building a practical copyright licensing model that would generate
spontaneous digital copyright licenses to accommodate the creative
impulses of web users. To achieve this end, copyright and technology
scholars, politicians, users of digital content, and copyright owners are
1. An essential facet of a balanced solution includes respect for the "copyright
bargain"-the idea that copyright provides a limited monopoly to creators or original works
and/or copyright owners for the purpose of enriching the public domain. This is, of course,
in keeping with notions of copyright in common law jurisdictions and would not be true in
the civil law tradition of droit d'auteur. However, incorporating key facets of droit d'auteur
and acknowledgment of some sort of the civil law traditions would enhance the balance of
an international licensing solution and so should not be overlooked. See generally TYLER
OCHOA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 133-60 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007); Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights:
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990)
(contemplating the differences between the two traditions).
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encouraged to regroup and re-focus their attention in a collaborative
and cooperative way to that ensure that content users see copyright
clearance as a simple process rather than a burden or obstacle.
The first part of this Article explores the current relationship
between copyright and the Internet with respect to the participative
web and, more specifically, to user-generated content (UGC). The
second part looks to the future of Internet technology and explains
how copyright licensing models can adopt a multi-territorial licensing
approach, which is one of the most important hurdles that online
licensing models must overcome. The third part offers suggestions on
how copyright stakeholders might work to achieve the proposed goal: a
multi-territorial, spontaneous copyright licensing model. This Article
relies upon two main assumptions: first, that licensing is the most
efficient and effective way to manage copyright online;2 and second,
that clear, consistent licensing practices that are compatible with
national legislative differences, web users' needs, and copyright
owners' interests are necessary to effectively monetize and legitimize
the use of copyright protected content online.
3
2. The exclusive right of authors to exploit their works or authorize others to do so
is a basic element of copyright. That said, the real value in exclusive rights is derived from
the fact that the rights owner can ensure that his work is exploited in a way that
corresponds to his intentions and interests. The assumption made by users when content is
online is that it wants to be "free." For users, licensing provides "insurance" of sorts
because it reduces or eliminates the likelihood of a licensee being held liable for
infringement. MIHALY FICSOR, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED
RIGHTS 15-16 (WIPO, 2002); Luuk M. Spee, Licensing or Piracy: How to Decrease
Deadweight Loss? 42 (Univ. of Utrecht Working Paper Series, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924163. For the sake of additional clarification, in the context of
this Article, efficient online management will enable multiple licenses to be issued in a
minimal amount of time and effective licenses meet users' needs and allow them to use
copyright content in the ways that they want. This also means that rights owners agree
with these uses and are compensated accordingly. Id.
3. This is a large assumption because the acceptance of a copyright licensing
regime as a solution to the problems set out in this paper could be seen as narrowing the
scope of copyright. This is because copyright permission may become the de facto norm.
The licensing model could become convoluted and incomprehensible, particularly if the
language is dense. Requiring individual users to engage with a licensing regime may be
considered to place unfair burdens on them. Licensing is also considered to be a form of
private ordering. Future licensing strategies should consider the merits and drawbacks of
these concerns in greater detail than will be offered in this paper. See generally LUCIE
GUIBAULT, THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN
INFORMATION LAW 87-104 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bert Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Graeme
Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Systems: Treaties, Norms, National
Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELL. PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEV. 61-114 (Daniel
Gervais ed., 2007); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Its Substitutes, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 865,
865-71 (1997); P.Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright, Contract and Code: What Will Remain of the
Public Domain?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 77, 77-90 (2000). See, e.g., GUIBAULT, supra note 3,
at 101.
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This Article intends to start this discussion and so is by no
means exhaustive. It serves to remind copyright stakeholders that the
problems associated with online copyright licensing can be resolved.
4
That said, there is no delusion here and one must acknowledge that
the resolution of the issues addressed in this Article will not be a
simple task. To reach this goal, all stakeholders must come to the
table and make some basic policy decisions; some losses will occur, but
a higher likelihood of long-term gain should be anticipated.
I. How FAR HAVE WE COME?
A. Technologically Speaking
Internet technologies have advanced exponentially over the
last two decades, resulting in what has been labelled the "generative
Internet. '5 "Generativity," as Professor Jonathan Zittrain explains, "is
a function of a technology's capacity for leverage across a range of
tasks, adaptability to a range of different tasks, ease of mastery and
accessibility."6 In parsing out this definition, Zittrain clarifies that
"generative technology makes difficult jobs easier," "adaptability ...
permits leverage for previously unforeseen purposes," "[a] technology's
ease of mastery reflects how easy it is for broad audiences both to
adopt and adapt it," and that "[t]he more readily people can come to
use and control a technology, along with what information might be
required to master it, the more accessible the technology is." 7 Thus,
the Internet is considered generative:
[T]he establishment of a private ordering system through mass-market licenses
does not share the same justification as the statutory copyright regime. The
main reason for this is that the private ordering mechanism follows other values
and choices than the public ordering system. The former gives priority to
economic power, leaving no room for public interest considerations, which the
latter system attempts to arbitrate through the political process or processes in
civil society. As a result the terms of use that are developed through the market
system alone are likely to be dominated by the interests of those who enjoy
superior economic power. The typical mass market information license therefore
completely foregoes the normal democratic process, to the benefit of the
information provider (who enjoy superior economic power) and the detriment of
the user.
Id.
4. For the sake of clarity, the term "stakeholders" includes users, owners, policy
makers, academics, practitioners, legislators, etc.
5. See generally Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1974 (2006).
6. Id. at 1981.
7. Id. at 1981-82.
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[Adaptability exists in large part because Internet protocol relies on few
assumptions about the purposes for which it will be used and because it efficiently
scales to accommodate large amounts of data and large numbers of users. It is
easy to master because it is structured to allow users to design new applications
without having to know or worry about the intricacies of packet routing. And it is
accessible because, at the functional level, there is no central gatekeeper with
which to negotiate access and because its protocols are . . . not subject to
intellectual property restrictions.
8
Many people understand the evolution of the Internet in terms of
what it can and cannot do, as evidenced by the increasingly common
use of labels such as Web 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 which typically describe the
stages of advancement of the Internet's capabilities. 9 During the "Web
1.0" phase (pre-2001), the web existed as a read-only medium with
minimal UGC. 10  However, "Web 2.0" (approximately 2001-2010)
illustrates a substantial increase in the number of web users
generating their own content, either by using existing content or
creating entirely new content. Thus, it may be said that Web 2.0 relies
on the input of its users to establish a database of collective
intelligence."
The rise of participative technology really defines Web 2.0, as
evidenced by websites like Flickr and YouTube. 12 One commentator
characterizes the change from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 as the "move from
personal websites to blogs and blog site aggregation, from publishing
to participation, from web content as the outcome of large up-front
investment to an ongoing and interactive process, and from content
management systems to links based on tagging (folksonomy)."' 3 It is
also in the context of Web 2.0 that the legal field has seen an increase
in the amount of attention given to online copyright management
issues.1
4
8. Id. at 1988.
9. Although these labels often inspire debate as to their meaning, I will
nonetheless rely on them for simplicity's sake.
10. Tim Berners-Lee et al., The Semantic Web, Sci. AM., May 2001, at 34. See
generally, Dion Hinchcliffe's Web 2.0 Blog, All We Got Was Web 1.0, When Tim Berners-Lee
Actually Gave Us Web 2.0, http://web2.wsj2.com/all-wegot_was-web10whentim
_bernersleeactually-gaveus w.htm (Sept. 4, 2006).
11. Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the
Next Generation of Software, 1 COMM. & STRATEGIES 17, First Quarter, 2007, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1008839.
12. This characterization is perhaps overly simplistic; however, for the purposes of
this Article (at this time) the precise technological advancements will not be addressed.
13. New Media - Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New-media (last visited
Mar. 29, 2009) (citing TERRY FLEW, NEW MEDIA 13 (Oxford University Press, 2005)).
14. See infra note 68.
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B. Copyright Licensing and its General Problems
Copyright is a set of economic and moral rights held by a
copyright owner or owners that result from the creation of an original
work. In general, copyright attaches to a work (be it artistic, literary,
dramatic, or musical) and grants a monopoly to the copyright owner(s)
over certain uses of that work, such as reproduction, communication to
the public by telecommunication, adaptation, or translation.
Copyright infringement occurs when someone uses a protected work
without permission unless the use falls under an exception to the rule,
such as fair use. 15 Practically speaking, a copyright owner's economic
rights are monetized through licensing regimes. Generally, the
licensor, or copyright owner grants permission to a licensee for a
specified use according to certain terms and conditions, possibly in
exchange for some type of consideration. 16 Many copyright owners
voluntarily elect to have collective management organizations (CMOs)
manage their economic rights because CMOs can do this more
efficiently.1
7
Traditionally, copyright management was premised on discrete
subject matter, territorial boundaries, and the varied set of rights
attached thereto. The Internet has changed this: territorial
boundaries have become blurred, the number of people making use of
protected works has increased, and the reason for these uses is no
longer limited to commercial use as it was in the early days of
copyright.18 As a result, copyright management systems that relied on
these notions have begun to unravel.
Before the mass move to digital content, copyright was
exploited in a relatively functional manner and was primarily
managed via collective management organizations. Licensing was
expected to take time, and user groups (typically
commercial/professional users) generally knew what copyright was
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
16. No such permission is required in the context of compulsory or statutory licence
regimes as a rule. In addition, blanket licenses would not likely operate in this
"transactional" way. A typical example of a blanket licence would be a licence generated
from a copyright tariff as set by a quasi-judicial administrative body or tribunal (e.g. the
Copyright Board of Canada). See generally WIPO, Collective Management of Copyright and
Related Rights, http://www.wipo.intlabout-ip/en/collective-mngt.html (last visited Apr. 29,
2009).
17. This is typically done by an assignment of the rights to the CMO. However, in
some cases the CMO may act as an agent for the copyright owner. Thus, an assignment is
not necessary. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT
AND RELATED RIGHTS (Kluwer, 2006) (thoroughly discussing CMOs).




and when they needed a license, although they may not have known
who owned that copyright. 19 For example, if a user wanted a license
he had to seek permission from a CMO in the territory where he
planned to make the use. If the CMO did not represent the rights to
permit the prospective use, the user would have been forced to look
elsewhere for permission, which meant additional time and money. If
the work was in the CMO's repertoire, the CMO told the user how
much his intended use would cost, and then the user could have
decided whether or not to use the work.20 Even if the licensing process
had been more informed, there were still, and remain to be, major
challenges to overcome. For example, establishing ownership of
copyright remains a major issue, particularly since copyright
ownership does not always vest with the original author(s) of the work
and is often subject to fragmentation. As such, there may be different
owners for each of the rights in a single work and, to add to the
confusion, these rights may also have multiple owners. 21
The bundle of rights afforded to copyright owners is
traditionally monetized according to particular types of use. For
instance, reproduction and public performance may fetch different
licensing fees. If the copyright owner entrusts a CMO to manage
these rights, he will likely deal with two different CMOs: one that
manages reproduction rights and another that manages performance
19. This is not to say that questions of ownership do not arise in the context of
online uses. See generally Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright,
Fragmented Management: Proposals to Defrag Copyright Management, 2 CAN. J.L. & TECH.
15 (2003); see infra note 20 (providing an example of a problem that has existed for more
than fifty years).
20. It is important not to assume that unlicensed uses did not occur. In fact they
did. One example of large-scale unlicensed use is the "pending list" kept by Canadian
CMOs representing mechanical rights for musical works. The pending list is a term used
by the music industry:
[T]o refer to a royalty account or statement which deals with royalties which are
payable by the record company with respect to the reproduction of musical works
and in respect of which the record company has not yet obtained a mechanical
licence. So an account of royalties yet to be distributed or on hold or pending
certain information. Some companies call these 'address unknown' or'unmatched.' They go by a variety of names. They are referred to in the
mechanical licensing agreement under the name 'unlicensed recording lists,' but
the term of art in the industry seems to have evolved to 'pending list' . . . . It is a
species of account that is maintained individually by the record label. Some
labels have one, some have several.
As indicated by Mr. Baskin during his testimony, the total "declared" value in the major
label pending lists is "approximately $50 million" (Canadian dollars). Transcript of Hearing
at 997-99, David Baskin, President, CMRRA, Copyright Board of Canada, CSI
CMRRAISODRAC Inc (Online Music Services) for the years 2005-2007, hearing transcript,
v. 5.
21. See generally Gervais & Maurushat, supra note 19 (discussing the problem of
fragmentation).
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rights. Further adding to the fragmentation described above is the
possibility that more than one copyright owner may have an interest
in a particular fragmented right (such as reproduction). Moreover, to
clear a use that spans multiple territorial jurisdictions, each territory
will likely require its own license. The problems created by such
complex fragmentation of copyright and its management make the
rights clearance process particularly difficult to maneuver, even for
trained industry professionals. 22 The issue becomes more problematic
when CMOs do not own 100 percent of the rights to a particular work,
or when they do not hold the rights at all. When this occurs, the user
may still need to contact the copyright owner prior to making use of a
work and seek permission for the use. As a result, establishing
ownership and actually obtaining a license is often quite difficult,
costly, and at times impossible. 23
C. Digital Licensing
Digital licensing is a newer phenomenon for content
traditionally delivered in physical form.24  The interactive and
generative nature of the Internet makes it especially well-suited to
licensing transactions between copyright holders, producers,
intermediaries, and web users.25 In theory, digital licensing can be
particularly helpful when it offers clear terms and conditions of use
that limit the liability of content providers when the content is
misused.26 However, practically speaking, licensing online content
has continued to be challenging, which is in part a result of increased
demands upon the copyright-permissions system. These demands
require copyright licensors to deal with an increased number of simple
transactional-licensing requests while developing new ways to educate
the growing population of online content users about why they should
22. Id.
23. Niva Elkin-Koren, Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit in
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault, eds., 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885466.
24. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 100 (2000) [hereinafter THE DIGITAL DILEMMA].
25. S~verine Dusollier et al., Copyright and Access to Information in the Digital
Environment, July 17 2000, at 18, available at http://webworld.unesco.org/infoethics2000
/documents/study-poullet en.rtf.
26. See THE DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 24, at 100.
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comply with the existing copyright system.27 These strategies have
yet to render large-scale compliance.
A particularly persuasive argument that explains why
copyright licensing has not been successfully implemented online is
that copyright is a right to be exploited amongst professionals.
According to Professor Daniel Gervais, "copyright was not meant to
exclude use by individual end-users, and trying to make it fit that job
description is unlikely to work, and, from a historical point of view,
denatures the underlying policy,"2 -which is "to promote progress in
the arts and sciences and to spread culture. ''2
9
So, should copyright law exclude users from doing what they
want with protected online content? In short, no-content users still
largely perceive copyright as a multitude of inconveniently placed stop
signs on the Internet highway. Some might stop, others may yield,
but the majority of content users still appear to be rolling right
through. This disregard of copyright occurs when copyright is used to
prohibit individual uses on the Internet and is challenged by strong
social norms that have developed from "the informal, intuitive and
global nature of the Internet."
30
Individual users want to engage technology and participate in
the new creative realm of the web. Why should copyright stop them?
Indeed, there are strong arguments that it should not. For example,
human rights supporters advocate for protection of the right to
cultural participation 3' and access to knowledge. 32 In this context,
using copyright to prevent or limit access to works that contribute to
individuals' understanding of culture is problematic. 33  Allowing
27. In some jurisdictions like Canada, blanket licences have been sought and issued
to manage commercial uses of collectively managed copyright online. While these licences
are helpful, they are also very expensive and only applicable to particular types of use. See,
e.g., Statement of Royalties to be Collected by SOCAN for the Communication to the Public
by Telecommunication, in Canada, of Musical or Dramatico-Musical Works, Copyright
Board of Canada, Oct. 24, 2008 [hereinafter Statement of Royalties].
28. Daniel Gervais, Use of Copyright Content on the Internet: Considerations on
Excludability and Collective Licensing, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 517, 524-25 (Michael Geist ed., 2005), available at
http://www.irwinlaw.com/books.aspx?bookid=120 [hereinafter Gervais, Use of Copyright].
29. Statement of Royalties, supra note 27, at 3.
30. Gervais, Use of Copyright, supra note 28, at 525; see generally Mark F.
Schultz, Copynorms: Copyright Law and Social Norm in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 201-35 (Peter K. Yu
ed., 2007).
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27, http://www.un.org
/Overview/rights.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
32. Id. (Article 19).
33. If we consider that access debate, we see that it is two-fold. First, it
encompasses issues with physical access and not being able to experience a work because
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copyright owners to control the ways in which individuals make use of
copyright protected content on the Internet is not only a risk for
cultural participation and access to knowledge, but it also threatens
freedom of expression and potentially limits creativity. Moreover,
requiring content users to pay for every use of copyright protected
content inevitably assumes that users know when to seek permission
and from whom. This arrangement would also require that
permission will be granted in an efficient and cost-accessible manner.
Neither expectation is reasonable given the current situation. 34
On the other hand, adopting an unlimited right that permits
individuals to use protected content would likely offend the basic
copyright bargain between creators and society. 35 It would also ignore
existing international treaties that establish and protect the rights of
copyright owners to exploit their monopolies.36 This is particularly
important to keep in mind in the context of UGC that ultimately
becomes commercially valuable. This occurrence may be
characterized as the transition of non-commercial content to
commercially valuable content. Part III explains the problem with
this distinction.
This brief overview of copyright online merely scratches the
surface of a very contentious and politically charged debate that
affects a multitude of stakeholders, such as copyright owners, users,
policy makers, technological architects, commercial entities, scholars,
and legal practitioners. Thus, the next section examines how these
stakeholders have been addressing the licensing issues related to
online copyright content.
the copyright owner(s) have not given permission. Second, it encompasses economic access,
meaning not being able to access a work because of the cost of access; for example having to
pay a fee for every download. See generally JAN A. G. M. VAN DIJK, THE DEEPENING DMDE:
INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (Sage Publications, 2005).
34. The Creative Commons was developed in response to the concerns generated by
the access debate. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DowN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (The
Penguin Press, 2004).
35. See supra note 2.




II. WHERE ARE WE HEADING?
A. Online Licensing Initiatives
This Part explores three different licensing initiatives. Each
offers important lessons to be considered by developers of future
licensing models. Moreover, each model demonstrates particular
stakeholder interests. Creative Commons is essentially a user's
model; BBC Archives is predominantly a government or public model;
and the Santiago Agreement was a copyright owners' model. The
differences between these approaches highlight the successes and
shortcomings of each model.
1. Creative Commons and "Some Rights Reserved"
Creative Commons (CC) is an initiative founded in 2001 to
build a more "reasonable, flexible copyright in the face of increasingly
restrictive default rules."37 Essentially, CC allows for "private rights
to create public goods" or "creative works [being] set free for certain
uses."38 It uses these rights to reach what it terms "cooperative and
community-minded" ends via "voluntary and libertarian" means.39
That is, CC aims to make it easier for non-profit players to engage in
creative enterprises.40  The CC user-interface relies on clear
terminology, basic symbols, and plain language to explain the
licensing process to both licensees and licensors.41 Additionally, users
of CC-licensed works need not contact the copyright owner for
permission since the system is essentially automated. Thus, the
likelihood that content users have to enter the licensing labyrinth is
minimal. Permission is granted when the work is marked with a CC
license. The only exception to this would be if a user wants to use a
work beyond the scope permitted in the existing license-for instance,
to use a work for commercial purposes. The CC model is compatible
37. Wiki.creativecommons.org, History, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/History
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008). See generally Michael Carroll, Creative Commons as
Conversational Copyright in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH:
ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445-61 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Niva Elkin-Koren, Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of A Worthy Pursuit, in
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault eds., 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=885466.
41. Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses (last visited Apr.
23, 2009).
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with many of today's digital uses, and should thus be considered as an
instructive starting point when researching any online licensing
solution.
The CC initiative is intended to address the issues associated
with traditional copyright licensing, such as high transaction costs,
slow turn-around time, dense legalese, and general inconvenience.
While the CC regime is primarily designed to facilitate content users'
needs, an exchange between owner and user nonetheless occurs.
At the producer's end, authors are offered a licensing scheme for distributing their
works for non-commercial use while at the same time safeguarding those works
against abuse and misappropriation of their efforts by asserting copyrights. The
idea is to facilitate the release of creative works under generous license terms that
would make works available for sharing and reuse. At the users' end, the platform
is expected to make it easier for prospective creators to identify works, which are
available under generous terms, for subsequent creation.
42
CC is not without limitations. It is often identified with the
copy-left movement.43 This association can be off-putting for copyright
owners seeking to protect their rights, and also for those who do not
buy into the political underpinnings of the CC system. Regarding the
licenses themselves, CC is not employable holus bolus for commercial
uses, particularly because it is not designed for commercial licensing.
44
Moreover, defining "commercial" use has proven problematic. As
illuminated by the next example-the BBC Archives Licence-there
appears to be some discrepancy in the definition of what exactly
constitutes commercial and non-commercial use online. In fact, in
mid-September of 2008, CC announced that it was launching a study
to establish the limitations of the two terms. 45 This distinction is
essential for purposes of clarity and certainty in online licensing
practices, and will continue to pose problems if a standardized online
definition is not reached. Another concern regarding CC licenses is
that they are territorially based; each country requires its own CC
licensing regime.46 This means that they have no effect on the
42. Elkin-Koren, supra note 40.
43. The copy-left movement is led by a broad range of individuals and organizations
representing libraries, academia, consumers, people with disabilities, and some creators -
the "copyleftists" fight against control, actively promoting and creating open source and
open content systems like FLOSS and Creative Commons. See Tanya Woods, Sharing the
Toys: Opening Digital Access to Museum Collections, MUSE MAG., Mar. 2007. See also
Creative Commons Canada, www.creativecommons.ca (last visited Apr. 23, 2009); Floss
Homepage, http://www.flossproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
44. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1, 13.
45. Press Release, Creative Commons, Creative Commons Launches Study of
"Noncommercial Use" (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://creativecommons.org
/press-releases/entry9554.
46. Elkin-Koren, supra note 40, at 1.
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problems associated with managing content territorially on a global
platform. As Professor Elkin-Koren notes, "[t]he lack of
standardization may further increase the cost to end users in
determining the duties and privileges related to any specific work.
Thus, the proliferation of contractual terms could increase uncertainty
among end users and create new barriers to access." 47
Although there are notable criticisms of the CC licensing
initiative, one cannot ignore that it has been immensely successful in
reaching copyright owners and users around the world. With licenses
available in forty-nine countries, and an additional six under
development, 48 it must be acknowledged that clear, simple, automated
licensing has great potential to generate both user buy-in and perhaps
respect for copyright.
2. BBC Archives Licence
In 2003 plans were announced to create a creative commons-
style license for archived BBC content. The BBC, the British Film
Institute, Channel 4, and the Open University co-developed the BBC
Archives Licence (BAL) as a pilot project and subsequently established
the Creative Archive Licence Group in 2003. 49 The goal of the
program was to make the archived content, which included moving
images, audio, and stills, available for download by users in the UK
for "learning, for creativity and for pleasure."
50
The BAL model was largely based on the CC licensing
initiative, and thus generated similar concerns and limitations. For
example, content users had to agree to use the licensed material solely
for non-commercial purposes.51 The license itself had five restrictions:
(1) works could only be used for non-commercial purposes; (2) users
had to be located within the UK; (3) use could not be for endorsement
purposes; (4) crediting the author of the work was necessary; and (5)
47. Id.
48. Creative Commons International, http://creativecommons.org
/international/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).
49. BBC Opens TV Archive to Remixers, BBC NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4225914.stm.
50. See BBC, CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT: A REPORT ON THE PILOT OF THE BBC's
OPEN CONTENT INITIATIVE (slides) 4 (2007), http://www.whatdotheyknow.com
/request/3109/response/7542/attach4/RFI20081039%20-%20disclosure%20document%20-
%20CAPilotReport%20(redacted).pdf [hereinafter CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT SLIDES]. See
also BBC Creative Archive Licence Group, FAQ http://www.bbc.co.uk/creativearchive
/faqs.shtml#calwhat (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
51. BBC Creative Archive Licence Group, http://creativearchive.bbc.co.uk
/archives (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
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subsequent derivative works had to be licensed in the same "share-
alike" manner. 52 The pilot project concluded in late 2006.
The BAL project required the BBC to work with content
stakeholders, and as such they were able to establish limitations of
use that gained their trust. These limitations included restricting
BAL-licensed content to factual genres, introducing user registration,
incorporating sub-commercial resolution levels relying on geo-
restrictions in the UK, and employing invisible watermark
technology.5
3
Once the pilot project concluded in 2006, little was heard about
the project until recently. In response to a Freedom of Information
Request, dated October 17, 2008, the Future Media and Technology
Department at the BBC explained:
The project's remit was to investigate the feasibility of giving BBC programme
assets (predominantly clips) to the public for their own private use. One of the
largest issues facing the project was obtaining the necessary intellectual property
rights clearances, including rights held by scriptwriters, musicians, actors doing
voiceovers, and footage acquired from external agencies. During the pilot it was
not uncommon for rights holders to decline permission to use their content for the
purposes of the project.
The end of the Creative Archive pilot coincided with the start of a much larger
project, the BBC Archive trial, with a wider remit looking at how the BBC could
release whole programmes for watching and listening purposes only. It was
decided to wait for this Archive trial to conclude in order for the BBC to assess the
Creative Archive and formulate its overall archive strategy.
54
The results of the pilot were positive. There were 500,000 downloads,
100,000 registered users, endorsement by the commercial sector,
international support, and an award from the British Academy of Film
and Television Arts for interactive innovation.5 5 Moreover, only two
minor breaches of the license occurred. 56 Surveys indicated that
content users understood the licenses "quite well," with the exception
52. BBC Creative Archive Licence Group, The Licence, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/creativearchive/licence/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 29, 2009).
53. CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT SLIDES, supra note 50, at 17.
54. Letter from L. Stiller, Legal & Bus. Affairs Manager, BBC Future Media &
Tech., to Stephen Gower (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://www.whatdotheyknow.com
/request/3109/response/7542/attach/html/3/RFI20081039%20%20final%20response.pdf
.html.
55. The study indicated that in the US, PBS stations are now working with the
Library of Congress to develop "America's Archive"; the Open Content Alliance supported
by Internet Archive, Yahoo, and PrelingerArchive; in Japan, NHK seeking government
permission to provide downloading for creativity; and in Australia a project is in
development at National Film and Sound Archives. CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT SLIDES,
supra note 50, at 47.
56. CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT SLIDES, supra note 50, at 21.
1154 [Vol. 11:4:1141
SPONTANEOUS COPYRIGHT LICENSING
of the non-commercial provision.57 Most users surveyed indicated that
they would merely watch the content, as opposed to using it to create
new works (the ratio was roughly 9:1).58 Many more users indicated
that they would share the content with others.5 9 With respect to the
rights clearance process, the report indicated that "all Creative
Archive content will be cleared and-where necessary-paid for," so
that the BBC could develop new pilot phases for specific genres (in
partnership with rights holders) and "maximise [sic] commercial
opportunities, including 'upgrade' purchases and new entrepreneurial
activities ."60
The report concluded by asserting that the ultimate goal of
universal online access to archived material could be achieved "within
a couple of decades at most."6' As revealed by a recent dealing with
the Francis Bacon collection, many negotiations with CMOs and other
rights holders (such as museums and estates) will be required, and
could fill up the clearance agenda for two decades.6 2 Waiting twenty
years for rights clearance is clearly not desirable.
3. CMOs and the Santiago Agreement
CMOs have been aware of these digital licensing issues for
some time. Indeed, it was this awareness that motivated five CMOs
(BMI in the United States, BUMA in the Netherlands, GEMA in
Germany, PRS in the United Kingdom, and SACEM in France) to
attempt to develop a new licensing model, which they then adopted in
2001.63 Since this agreement was adopted in Santiago, Chile, it is
commonly known as the Santiago Agreement (the Agreement).
6 4
Although the Agreement primarily focused on licensing musical
works, it nonetheless offers valuable insight applicable to all CMOs,
regardless of the rights they administer, since the Agreement was
international in scope, applicable in both common and civil law
57. Id. at 27-28.
58. CREATIVE ARCHIVE REPORT SLIDES, supra note 50, comment JD43.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 53.
61. Id. at 54.
62. Posting of Jim Sangster to BBC Internet Blog, http://www.bbc.co.uklblogs
/bbcinternet/2008/llforgotten-gemsjbbc archive.html (Oct. 1, 2008, 07:30 EST).
63. According to Fiscor, this was legally considered to be an "amendment" to the
existing contracts based on the CISAC Model Contract. FICSOR, supra note 2, at 114.
64. Id. See also Nathalie Piaskowski, Collective Management in France, in
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 153, 188 (Daniel Gervais
ed., 2006). The Agreement was notified to the Commission in April 2001. See Notification of
Cooperation Agreements European Communities, Notice 2001/C, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:145:SOM:EN:HTML (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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jurisdictions, and has been tested by the complex regional laws of the
European Union.
Commentators considered the Agreement to be a new approach
to multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licensing, designed as it was
to facilitate the issuance of licenses for the exploitation of works and
sound recordings on the Internet.65 It introduced a non-exclusive
licensing regime based on the multi-territorial licensing of authors'
rights of online communication to the public and the "making
available" right in reference to the provision of music downloading or
streaming,6 6 but did not encompass the reproduction rights vested in
these works or the simulcasting rights.
6 7
The Agreement mandated certain reporting requirements with
respect to the licensees. For instance, the Agreement required
licensees to submit the name of the copyright owner and titles of
works used.68 It also required CMOs, when accounting to the other
CMOs, to supply a list of the names, addresses, and website domain
names of each party to whom a license had been granted since the
previous accounting period. 69  In practice, the Agreement was
intended to serve as a template contract, allowing bilateral
agreements between users and CMOs, whereby an Internet user
would seek a world-wide license from the CMO in the territory on
65. Piaskowski, supra note 64, at 188.
66. Tilman Luder, The Next Ten Years in EU Copyright: Making Markets Work, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1, 49 (2007).
67. The reproduction right was covered in the BIEM/Barcelona Agreement,
European Communities, Notice OJ C 132/10, June 4, 2002, (Case COMP/C-2/38.377 Ac"
BIEM Barcelona Agreements), PbEG 2002/C 132/10, http://eur-lex.europa.eu
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:132:0018:0018:EN:PDF. This agreement dealt
with mechanical reproductions in relation to web-casting, on demand transmission by acts
of streaming and downloading and was structured in largely the same manner as the
Santiago Agreement. Simulcasting was covered in the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement. Press
Release, IFPI, Major Step Forward for Internet Licensing (Oct. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ifpi.org/contentlsection-news/20021008b.html. According to Mihaly Ficsor, the
European Commission accorded with the agreement because it felt that the single gateway
was in the interest of promoters and the general public; however, two modifications were
requested: (1) IFPI had to delete the notion of territorial exclusivity whereby users were
obliged to go to the CMO in the territory in which their website was hosted, and (2) the
agreement had to include a limited form of price competition by showing the society's
management fees in the applicable rate so that the promoter could choose the collective
society with which he wanted to have a relationship. FICSOR, supra note 2, at 120.
68. FICSOR, supra note 2, at 118. This in itself would likely have been problematic
since, in the case of musical works, this information may be unknown, hence the
phenomena of "orphan works" or "unlocatable" copyright owners' as it is known in some
jurisdictions. Id. Orphan works is both a national and international problem. For an
example of the U.S. treatment of orphan works see: Report on Orphan Works, Jan. 2006,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.




which the user's site was installed, thus enabling each CMO to offer
the repertoires of third-party CMOs to users (or licensees).
70
While the Santiago Agreement seemed to be a step in the right
direction, it was plagued by complex practical and legal problems-
most notably those raised by the European Commission in May 2004
where the Commission formally objected to the fact that certain
provisions of the Santiago Agreement were anti-competitive, making it
impossible for content users to select a collective society of choice, thus
giving the local collective societies territorial exclusivity. 71  The
Santiago Agreement expired at the end of 2004 and was not renewed,
in large part due to the issues raised in the investigation by the
European Commission. 72 While the efforts of the CMOs did not come
to fruition as intended, their goal might yet be realized. In early 2008
the European Commission announced that it would begin to develop a
pan-European, multi-territorial, interoperable licensing scheme.
73
This scheme promises to be yet another important piece of the online
copyright licensing puzzle.
The three licensing initiatives surveyed here provide important
lessons to consider going forward. Not least, they indicate that a
consensus must be reached on the meaning of the language used in
online licenses, that Internet licenses must be multi-territorial, that a
successful licensing scheme should inspire confidence from copyright
owners and users, and most importantly, that these licenses must be
administered efficiently in a readily accessible format for users.
B. Multi-territorial Copyright Licensing
At its most basic level, a multi-territorial copyright license
(MTL) permits a licensee to make use of a particular right in more
than one territory. Multi-territorial licensing with respect to online
content is far more nuanced-it allows a potential user to seek
70. Piaskowski, supra note 64, at 189.
71. Id.
72. Bennett Lincoff, Common Sense, Accommodation and Sound Policy for the
Digital Music Marketplace, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1, 25-26. See also Press Release,
European Union, Commission Opens Proceeding into Collective Licensing of Music
Copyrights for Online Use (May 3, 2004) available at http://europa.eulrapid
/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/586&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&gui
Language=en. However, efforts to find a solution for cross-border licensing have not ceased.
Press Release, CISAC, CISAC, ICMP, IMPA Reaffirm Commitment to Offering
Streamlined Licensing Solutions for Users (Feb. 1,2008), available at http://pr.euractiv.com
/?q=node/1495.
73. Commission Consultation: The Need for Pan-European Copyright Licences,
OUT-LAW NEWS, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.out-law.conilpage-8784.
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permission from one point of contact (likely a CMO) for a particular
Internet-wide use (for example, reproduction). There is currently no
universally acceptable MTL for the multitude of online rights
belonging to copyright owners. While a MTL would not solve all of the
copyright problems on the Internet, it would simplify the clearance
process and lower transaction costs for licensees.
7 4
While multi-territorial licensing does not eliminate
fragmentation entirely, it does enable the removal of one of the most
costly aspects of the clearance process: the acquisition of multiple
territorial licenses. In the global online environment, such licenses
are necessary to ensure that content travels lawfully beyond
territorial borders. The potential difficulties with the numerous
territorial licenses required at present must not be understated:
[Olne of the strongest factors that may preclude consistency between licences on an
international level is the terminological differences between national copyright
laws. This may actually hinder individual jurisdictions from creating licences that
can be attached to works and mixed with licensed works from other jurisdictions,
potentially fracturing the commons.
75
Furthermore, if a CMO administers the licenses, licensees
stand to benefit from the typical efficiencies of collective management,
such as expertise and established practices for the collection and
distribution of royalty fees. An efficient and effective MTL regime will
ensure that users gain a higher degree of certainty regarding the
lawfulness of their interactions with protected content. 76 In essence, a
successful MTL regime increases the likelihood that users would seek
permission prior to using copyrighted material, and provides certainty
to users that would be equally beneficial to rights owners.
The main drawback of establishing an MTL regime is that it is
multi-territorial. Copyright has not traditionally been administered
in a borderless environment. As such, rights owners fear losing both
control of their works and the ability to grant permission on their own
terms. Consequently, users cannot get efficient, lawful access to
copyright protected content. When looking for a multi-territorial
74. See Thomas Vinje & Ossi Niiranen, The Application of Competition Law to
Collecting Societies in a Borderless Digital Environment, E.U. COMPETITION L. & POL.
WORKSHOP/PROCEEDINGS 3 (2005), available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research
/Competitionl2005/200510-CompVinje.pdf.
75. Catherine Bond, Simplification and Consistency in Australian Public Rights
Licences 16-17 (Univ. of New S. Wales Law Research Paper No. 2007-51, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1003691.
76. As Mutoro et al. have noted, collective management can lead to efficiency gains
for copyright owners and commercial users alike. Mary Mutoro et. al, Collective Right




solution, stakeholders need not start from scratch. Existing
international agreements, such as the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 and its subsequent
revisions, set out minimum copyright standards agreed upon by 164
states-at least in principle.7 7 The establishment of harmonized
minimum intellectual property standards has become an essential
activity within the last ten years, and will continue to be relevant
going forward (particularly in relation to limitations and exceptions).
78
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) is also forcing the harmonization agenda
forward, by solidifying the relationship between intellectual property
and trade. 79  Digital licensing concerns have consequently been
elevated to new levels of priority. Although TRIPS sets out the initial
minimum standards for intellectual property protection, member
states have been inspired to "ratchet-up" these standards to what are
now commonly known as "TRIPS plus" standards.8 0 This Article will
not offer an in-depth discussion on this issue; however, it is important
to note that TRIPS plus standards require increased enforcement of
intellectual property rights, including copyright. The challenge here is
to find a means of ensuring that content users have a fair chance to
obtain permission legally before they are labeled as infringers. For
this reason, there is a pressing public and private need to establish a
functional infrastructure for online copyright licensing. This need will
only be satisfied by near-ubiquitous territorial licenses or a ubiquitous
licensing regime. In this respect, MTL offers the necessary means to
ensure that users in any territory can legally access copyright content.
So why is MTL necessary going forward? A look at the incoming
technological shift provides key answers here. Essentially, MTL is
77. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdflberne.pdf (last visited
Mar. 29, 2009) (listing all countries party to the Berne Convention); see generally Alan
Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed,
40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 763-801 (2003).
78. See generally P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth Okediji, Conceiving an International
Instrument on Limitations and Exceptions to Copyright: Final Report, OPEN SOCIETY
INSTITUTE, Mar. 6, 2008, available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information
/articles.publications/publications/copyright 20080506.
79. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 81, available
at http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/trips e/tagm0_e.htm.
80. See generally Susan Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting
and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, June 9, 2008, available at
http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/uploads/Sell IP EnforcementState of Play-
OPs_1_June_2008.pdf (for an overview of concerns resulting from ratcheting up IP
protection).
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compatible with the direction in which web technology is currently
headed.
C. Web 3.0
Web 3.0 will likely be increasingly characterized by the
organization and classification of data collected from users' online
activities. Coined the "semantic web" by Tim Berners-Lee, Web 3.0 is
more intelligent than its predecessors.81 Its intelligence represents
more than just data; it is the way in which the data is managed and
connected:
8 2
[The semantic web relies on] common formats for integration and combination of
data drawn from diverse sources, where on the original Web mainly concentrated
on the interchange of documents. It is also about language for recording how the
data relates to real world objects. That allows a person, or a machine, to start off in
one database, and then move through an unending set of databases which are
connected not by wires but by being about the same thing.
83
This transition to interconnected databases is exciting. Not only will
web users' demands be met more efficiently, they may also have more
freedom to interpret and integrate online content into their daily lives.
With the transition to Web 3.0, there will likely be an evolution of
content users' relationships with technological devices capable of
inter-relation, such as laptops and iPods.8 4 At the heart of this
relationship will be the desire to meet users' needs in the most
efficient and effective possible way.8 5  To achieve this goal,
technological developers and architects will continue working to
minimize the number of different devices required to carry out tasks.
Previously independent content technologies, such as MP3 players,
will morph into devices with multi-tasking capabilities. The added
value in these fiber-devices will be their level of programmed
intuitiveness, which will meet web users' need for instant gratification
and subsequently make on-demand, interactive content platforms the
norm.
81. Berners-Lee, supra note 10.
82. What is key to the efficient and effective functioning of Web 3.0 is meta-data,
particularly accurate metadata. See generally Marcel Gordon, Cleaning Metadata on the
World Wide Web: Suggestions for a Regulatory Approach, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 531, 533-41 (2006).
83. WC3 Semantic Web Activity, http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2009).
84. Interview with Peter Jaszi, Professor, Am. Univ. Washington Coll. of Law, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2008).
85. See generally Carroll, supra note 37.
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Given these predicted developments, it is safe to say that the
amount of UCG will also increase. As Professor Edward Lee explains:
[More and more software companies are developing Web 2.0 applications to enable
users to create content of their own. Already web developers have begun talking
about the next phase of the Internet-"Web 3.0"-in which the Internet essentially
takes over traditionally desktop-based applications (such as word processing,
spreadsheets, and PowerPoint) and converts them into web-based applications that
are greatly enhanced by access to unbelievable amounts of information stored in
the so-called "clouds," huge data centers that serve computers through the
Internet. As Nicholas Carr discusses, the shift to "cloud computing"-where
software applications and data storage come not in the personal computer, but
through the Internet connected to powerful databases-has the potential to
transform fundamentally how we communicate. Control over media "shifts
... from institutions to individuals."
8 6
Indeed, Web 3.0 offers great potential to those wishing to distribute
content, and to those seeking to use content. But what does this mean
for those who want to control their content? I propose that this means
two things: first, there is much potential to monetize copyright in this
environment; and second, there is a need to design a licensing model
that copyright owners are comfortable with to exploit the new
technology.
A recent comment from Terry McBride, CEO of Nettwerk
Music, sums up how copyright will fit into the next generation of the
web:
Clearly, the future is not the ongoing debate on control and ownership of
copyrights, with the big stick approach of suing fans. Music, along with all the
other forms of rich media, is going into the clouds where it will be pulled down
from servers when and how the consumer wants. The new values reside in what is
behind this media; the meta data. The quality and increase in value of this meta
data will have a profound effect on the future. Digital maids will be cleaning up
your media locker, moving files to where they belong and propagating your custom
and peer based playlists. Digital valets will be pulling down media from these
cloud servers and prepping it for the consumer's consumption. Songs will not only
be just the music, but will contain data that will allow foreign lyric translations,
edited versions, sheet music, instruction on how to play the song and so on. Future
economic models will be based on monetizing the behavior of the consumer by
adding true value.
8 7
This vision of the future is certainly possible-but is it attainable?
There is much work to be done before this vision can be realized.
86. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1500-01 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
87. Interview with Terry McBride, CEO, Nettwerk Music (Aug. 17, 2008), available
at http://www.crazedhits.com/terry-mcbride-interview/.
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III. How ARE WE GOING TO GET THERE?
A. Copyright Obstacles to Overcome
A great number of copyright obstacles must be overcome if we
are to implement an effective and efficient online licensing regime.
88
First, as discussed above, territorial licensing practices must be
broadened to mirror the way protected content actually moves on the
web-that is, globally.
Second, the licensing process needs to be streamlined and
simplified for users. It is no secret that individual users of online
content thrive on instant gratification.8 9 The "millennials" user group,
comprised of individuals born after 1981, illustrates this point in their
persistent demands that online content be made available
simultaneously across multiple formats, portals, and territories. 90
These individuals are less likely to venture into the licensing
labyrinth, but are more tech-savvy and consequently more likely to
seek out alternative, although not necessarily lawful, solutions.
Additionally, any international licensing regime must be relatively
easy to implement in countries with limited resources and
technological capabilities.
Third, stakeholders in the online licensing environment need to
establish a standard language for copyright terminology. By
"terminology," I am referring not only licensing definitions such as
"commercial" and "non-commercial," but also copyright language used
to describe UGC. Part of the trouble with labeling UGC in copyright
terms is that UGC itself has no agreed-upon definition.9 1 As a result,
it is difficult to make general conclusions regarding how to protect
UGC and how to classify it in copyright terms. This begs the question
of whether online content requires special legal treatment, or if it is
equivalent to traditional offline content. For example, one may argue
that UGC is not really anything new-it is merely the same type of
88. While this section sets out a number of suggestions, I have generally left open
the discussion of who should undertake these efforts as this is a whole other discussion and
beyond the scope of this paper.
89. This is clearly demonstrated by the rise of peer-to-peer networks and the
growing participation in platforms like YouTube.
90. Terry McBride & Brent Muhle, Meet the Millennials: Fans, Brands and
Cultural Communities: Executive Summary, MUSIcTANK, May 2008, at 3, available at
http://www.musictank.co.uk/reports/meet-the-millennials.
91. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev.: Working Party on the Info. Econ.,




work that exists in the terrestrial world, only presented in a new
medium. Importing this quandary into legal practice highlights
additional definitional challenges like how to establish what is
"original" so as to qualify for copyright protection. For these reasons,
among many others, a universal, ubiquitous Internet license will be
difficult to implement, and so a more flexible licensing scheme should
be contemplated.
92
Fourth, an international agreement on minimum standards for
copyright limitations and exceptions must be established. Work has
commenced in this area, although it is uncertain if and when
harmonization will occur. 93 As countries continue to implement
TRIPS (and TRIPS plus) obligations, there is an increasingly strong
push for vigorous enforcement measures that favor the interests of
copyright owners. 94  While such measures are important, there
appears to be a tendency to bypass the limits and exceptions to
copyright norms established in more developed copyright systems.
These exceptions and limitations work to strike a balance and
maintain respect for the copyright bargain. In a practical licensing
regime, a harmonized set of limitations and exceptions would serve to
construct helpful boundaries for both copyright owners and users,
while clarifying which uses and users need to be licensed.
Fifth, a policy decision must be made to determine how to
classify UGC-specifically, whether to treat non-commercial creations
differently than commercial creations. While the vast majority of
UGC is never monetized, there are instances in which is it, and
copyright ownership in UGC becomes important. So, if a broad
exception were made that permitted users to do as they please with
protected content online, at what point would monetization of
copyright become an option if the UGC became valuable? It would
seem wholly unfair for a user to prosper from his creation if it were
derived from a previously existing protected work, while no benefit is
returned to the copyright owner of the original work. 95 In this case,
92. Courts in different jurisdictions (state, national, or regional) tend to define
originality in different ways so that what may be original in one jurisdiction may not be
original in another. When trying to define what works will qualify for protection, the
originality inquiry is crucial. Given the years of judicial precedence dedicated to developing
the meaning of this term it is unlikely that an international consensus could ever be
reached.
93. A key report being that of P. Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji noted above.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., supra note 80, and accompanying text.
95. Classifying UGC is really about drawing lines in the sand and further
establishing the scope or reach of copyright, which seems to blur with what is considered
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perhaps a regime that allowed users to preserve these rights and later
monetize their creation would be helpful.
96
Finally, there remains a need to educate users on copyright.
This need arises primarily from the current liability content users face
if they are deemed to have infringed a protected work. Licensing
schemes like Creative Commons have demonstrated that education
can be incorporated into a licensing regime. For example, CC's videos
and simple licenses are explanatory and helpful in explaining
copyright issues to ordinary users. A subsequent, albeit indirect,
benefit of educating users is that once they understand how copyright
law works and what it means for the economy, they may develop more
respect for copyright and in turn may become more inclined to
participate in the policy and legal discussions that will ultimately
affect their uses of protected content.
B. Collaboration and Cooperation
Collaboration and cooperation amongst stakeholders in the
online environment is essential if copyright licensing is to have a
future on the web, since online innovation is considered ". . . the
primary means through which both the creative rights and technology
industries come to understand and benefit from increasing the
steadily evolving nature of consumer demand."97 Potentially affected
stakeholders, as mentioned above, include technological architects and
software designers, copyright owners, content distributors, creators,
users, policy makers, and lawyers. Some scholars have gone as far as
to say that "stakeholders are expected to find innovative and
collaborative solutions to exploit content online and prevent or remedy
bundling, exclusivity or non-use of media rights."9 8
A dialogue between stakeholders is crucial to establishing a
successful licensing model. It will inspire confidence among owners
and content users, as was demonstrated in the BBC Archives case
study discussed in Part II. Also, a dialogue would help to ensure that
the public domain, an issue that Lessig and others have raised for some time. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUM. 56 (2006).
96. This is a suggestion made by Professor Jerome Reichman at the 2008 User-
Generated Content, Social Networking and Virtual Worlds Roundtable at Vanderbilt
University Law School.
97. David Touve & Will Page, Should Societies Pursue Equity?, ECONOMIC INSIGHT,
May 21, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.prsformusic.com/monline/research/Documents
/Economic%20Insight%209.pdf.
98. i2010: A European Information Society for Growth and Employment,




the licensing regime is balanced between copyright owners and
copyright content users. Additionally, collaboration will alert
stakeholders to the potential shortcomings of any proposed regime. A
simple example is a suggested licensing regime that requires users to
contact their local CMO. However, there may be no CMO in a given
country or region. In this case, collaboration at the design stage of the
project would enable alternative provisions to be considered without
much consequence. Therefore, any international solution will
necessarily have to account for territorial differences in the way that
copyright is managed from a practical, theoretical, and political
standpoint. 99 Finally, collaboration amongst stakeholders may assist
in defining future market trends that could have a practical influence
on the technologies used to build and operate an international,
spontaneous licensing regime. For example, knowledge of how
available technology functions may cause a rights owner to prefer a
particular type of licensing method-perhaps one that includes
technical protection measures or digital rights management features.
Understanding what users want would be important because
they are the consumer group whose actions will ultimately monetize
copyright for rights owners like CMOs. It is perhaps for this reason
that CMOs have started working with content distributors. In 2006,
the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society-Performing Right Society
Alliance (MCPS-PRS Alliance) announced that they had arrived at an
agreement with EMI, a British record company, to work toward the
creation of a "one-stop shop" to clear the rights of EMI's Anglo-
American songs for mobile and online music use in Europe. 100 In
2007, cooperation between CMOs and content providers enabled the
band Radiohead to release its album In Rainbows online in a one-stop-
shop (MTL) format.10 1 The album proved to be a major success and
was downloaded more than one million times.10 2
99. This accounts for things like regional differences in legal traditions.
100. Mutoro, supra note 76, at 11.
101. David Byrne, David Byrne's Survival Strategies for Emerging Artists - and
Megastars, WIRED, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music
/magazine/16-O1/ff-byrne?currentPage=4; Posting of Richard Driver to BloggingStocks,
http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2007/12l1 1/warner-chappell-launches-new-licensing-model-
for-radiohead-albuml (Dec. 11, 2007, 16:34 EST); Penny Distribution,
http://pennydistribution.wordpress.com/2008/01/06/radiohead-and-in-rainbows-pushing-
the-boundaries-in-publishing-tool (Dec. 15, 2007, 22:22 EST).
102. Mimi Turner, Radiohead Says No More Music Freebies, REUTERS, May 2, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKN2937610420080430 (noting that
Radiohead's album sales topped both US and UK charts despite the fact that it was offered
as a free download prior to the release of the CD).
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C. Web 3. 0 and Spontaneous Copyright Licensing
Spontaneous copyright licensing is closer to realization than
ever before. This statement may seem laughable in relation to the
copyright woes described above; however, when one considers it in
technological terms, such a bold statement actually seems plausible.
CMOs have been working hard for over ten years to create a
database of the repertoire of rights they hold across the globe. The
database is called the Common Information System (CIS), and is
regarded as ". . . a critical requirement if rights societies are to
function effectively and protect the principle of collective rights
administration in the digital age." 10 3 The CIS initiative has been
largely spearheaded by the Confederation Internationale des Socidtds
dAuteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC). CISAC was founded in 1926 to
strengthen and develop the international network of CMOs, and later
to create standard terms of agreement between authors' societies,
thereby enhancing interoperability between CMOs.
10 4
In 1998 the main challenges to implementing the CIS database
were the lack of standardized licensing practices and the lack of
infrastructure "for collection societies and other protectors of
intellectual property rights to share information about musical works
and other 'creations."' 105 These challenges still exist today. If an
efficient licensing regime is to be established, CMOs must collaborate
to "standardise [sic] the way information is structured within a
common system architecture."10 6  This architecture "will enable
[CMOs] to progressively streamline their administration, ultimately
achieving significant economies of scale while creating more efficient
mechanisms for exchanging information to support automated
transactions for the licensing, tracking and monitoring functions
demanded by a dynamic digital trading environment." 10 7  This
statement is not only intuitive, but relevant-the main difference
being that CMOs no longer need to contemplate or resolve these issues
on their own. Because Web 3.0 has the capacity to pull information
from a number of databases to address a user's single request, the
quest to create a standalone technology to do this seems somewhat
redundant, particularly since Web 3.0 will ultimately be used to
support applications now reliant on separate operating systems, such
103. Keith Hill, Int'l DOI Found., CIS - The Common Information System, May 7,
1998, available at www.doi.org/workshop/minutes/CISoverview/CISoverview.ppt.
104. CISAC, http://www.cisac.org/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).





as computer desktops. Arguably, establishing copyright standards
seems more important at the current stage of development. The
technology is there, or almost there. What the technology cannot do is
negotiate copyright policy, or make judicial decisions-it can do what
we want it to, we just need to decide what we want and tell it how.
As the goal of this Article is only to introduce an approach to
copyright licensing online, I will conclude this discussion by posing a
few important questions that deserve additional attention going
forward. First, is a ubiquitous copyright licensing regime necessary or
could a ubiquitous data management platform suffice in the world of
Web 3.0? Second, what is the real degree of international copyright
harmonization at present, and what steps are needed to reach
harmonization if we are not there yet? Third, does harmonization
matter for the purpose of establishing an international licensing
model? Fourth, what is an acceptable degree of "loss" or compromise
for countries that may want to adopt an international licensing
regime, and is there truly a risk of losing their copyright traditions
along the way? Fifth, how important is private ordering and is there a
way to build enough balance into an international system to
counteract any concerns? Finally, if we do not come up with a
licensing solution for the online permissions problem, then what else
should we be doing to solve this problem, and will another solution
really make it all better?
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article offers an approach to resolving one of the most
unnecessarily complex issues plaguing web users today-the globally
unmanageable copyright licensing system. As technology advances,
stakeholders should work to consider new ways in which it may be
utilized to reduce if not remove this obstacle.
While licensing efforts to date have made progress, there has
yet to be a serious introduction of a truly international licensing
regime for Internet uses of protected content. As this Article has set
out, any future attempt to craft such a system will require designers
and stakeholders to consider: (1) the complexity of the system and the
language used to explain the regime and its licenses, (2) the ability of
less developed countries to implement the regime, (3) mechanisms of
balance, (4) clarity on the actual scope of copyright in the online
environment, and (5) extensive collaboration and cooperation will be
key to ensuring that there are adequate levels of buy-in and use of the
system once it is operational. That said, ultimately, some degree of
compromise will be necessary. Until stakeholders become more
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willing to work together, the actual establishment of a spontaneous
copyright licensing regime will remain nothing more than a pipe
dream.
